Trepo is the operating system for the kitchen. Households use it to know what they have and cook with it — and every time they do, it records what a real home actually eats.
Households get their kitchen back. The market gets a signal it has never had.
Delivery in an hour. Ten thousand items in an aisle. There is still no system for the part that comes after it arrives.
Nobody can see their own pantry from the store. The third jar of cumin is a visibility problem, not a discipline problem.
What you forgot you owned goes off behind what you bought instead.
A whole industry exists to get food into the home. Almost nothing exists for the six days it sits there.
We measure buying down to the cent.
We do not measure eating at all.
So the one fact that decides the next shop — what is in the house, and how fast it is going — is the one fact nobody writes down.
Retail media is the fastest-growing ad channel in the world, and it runs on purchase history. One retailer sees one basket. Everything else is a model of what probably happened.
Four questions no brand can answer today. We can answer all four, per household, per week.
The whole basket around your brand — including the banners you have no data from.
Trial or repeat, observed in the home instead of inferred from a loyalty card.
Days between one purchase and the next. The replenishment window, per household.
On the list first, or only at check-in. One is a habit. The other is winnable.
Both problems are the same missing dataset. The household cannot see its own kitchen, and neither can anyone selling into it.
Purchase data is a lagging guess.
Everyone measures the checkout. Nobody measures the pantry.
A purchase says a unit left a shelf. Consumption says it was used, and is about to be needed again.
It cannot be bought. It exists only if a household chooses to tell you, week after week.
An agent that shops for you needs to know what you have, not what you once bought.
Nobody fills in a profile. The household just uses the product, and the pattern falls out of the timestamps.
Nothing at midday Monday to Friday, plenty at noon on Saturday. They work outside the home.
Three cans a day, every week, for months. We know the Thursday before they run out.
They did not run out and they did not stop eating yogurt. They switched brands — and we can see to what.
Club, discounter, corner shop. The whole basket — which no single retailer can assemble.
Today a brand pays to reach “households that probably buy soda.” We can tell them which home runs out on Thursday.
Trepo tracks what a household has, tells them what they can cook with it, and turns what is running out into the shopping list. Halo sits where the food is, so logging costs a second and happens at the moment it is true.



The app. It drove every number on the traction slide.
Halo. It turns occasional logging into continuous measurement, and it is the hardest part to copy.
The graph. It compounds with use and cannot be bought at any price.
Nobody is asked to track anything. Each job the household actually wants done narrows the signal one step further — from everything that came in, to what they are about to buy.
Availability has never been higher, and there is still no system for what happens once it is home.
The interface is close to solved. The data it needs is not.
A retailer knows what you bought at that retailer. It cannot see the other four stores. An agent built on one banner reorders a fraction of a household.
On-device AI turned capturing consumption into a two-second act. That is why this dataset can exist now and could not five years ago.
A retailer sees its own share of a household. We see the whole house, because the household tells us directly.
Six weeks from launch to twelve thousand households, with no paid acquisition engine behind it.
And they use it. Signups are cheap. Logged food is not — every number below is a household choosing to do work for us.
Built from the bottom up, off one household — and off what a public grocery platform actually earns.
At 5M households that is $215M a year. At 10M, $429M.
Instacart earns 2.9% of basket value in advertising against the orders it fulfils. We hold the whole household — every store, and what actually got eaten — which is the targeting and measurement layer they cannot build from their own checkout.
5M is the recommendation: 3.7% of US homes, and roughly $1.3B a year across both lines at $261 a household. Matt and Zach to confirm before this is shown. The 2.9% comp rate is Instacart's realised rate on its own fulfilled orders; selling against the whole multi-retailer basket is the thesis, not a proven rate.
Nobody set out to build this stack. A notes app for the list, a delivery app to order, a recipe app to decide, a loyalty card for the deal, and memory for everything in between. None of them talk to each other, and none of them know what is in the house.
The list, the recipes and the inventory are the same product. That is the consumer pitch, and it is why the logging happens at all.
Their data is a by-product of a transaction they own. Nobody logs their pantry into a checkout.
Every log makes the next recommendation better, which makes the next log more likely.
Brands pay for what no panel can give them: household-level consumption on their category, across every banner their buyer shops. Already in market — our first partner one-pager went out on real portfolio data.
This round funds the ad products on top of it:
Once the graph knows the cadence, the list becomes an order. We take a share of a basket the household was always going to buy.
$43 per household per year at a 3% take — a line that scales with households rather than with sales headcount.
We get there first. A retailer only learns you need it when you turn up and buy it — we know before that, so we are the one who asks.
Data revenue funds household growth. Household growth makes the data more valuable and the replenishment volume bigger. Neither line caps the other.
The end state is an agent that keeps a house stocked without being asked — and we own the only inputs it can trust.
Every household added improves both lines at once. That is the compounding we are asking investors to buy.
The device is not a revenue line. It is the highest-fidelity logging surface in the home, it deepens the dataset per household, and it pays for itself at point of sale.
Builds the thing, hardware and software both. The Halo device, the firmware, the OTA pipeline, the ingestion backend and the Kitchen Graph itself are his. Previously Neuro and Tesla.
Matt's exact titles, dates and the two or three shipped accomplishments he wants named at Neuro and Tesla. Not inventing a bio for a diligence document.
Owns revenue, and has stood on both sides of the trade we are building. Retail media and advertising at Viant; CPG sales and marketing leadership at USCAPE — the buyer of this data, and the seller of the products it measures.
Zach's exact titles, dates and accomplishments. The framing above is the argument; the credentials need to be his words.
The pairing is the point. This company needs someone who can ship a consumer hardware and AI product, and someone who already knows what a CPG brand will pay for the data it produces.
Growth is the line that is real today: 2 households to 12,927, effectively all of it in six weeks. Revenue starts on the data side, where a partner conversation is already live. The replenishment line turns on once the graph is dense enough to predict cadence per category.
A 24-month projection needs monthly burn and cash on hand. Give me both and the model gets built as a supporting document, which is where Icehouse says it belongs — alongside the cap table, the hiring plan and a written investor FAQ. The deck slide stays this thin on purpose.
Data revenue booked to date, pipeline value, and the assumed month the replenishment take-rate switches on.
We are raising $X.XM on a $XXM cap SAFE to turn a working consumer product into the consumption layer that agentic shopping will have to run on.
Take the graph from thousands of kitchens to the density where cadence becomes predictable per category.
Build sampling, follow-along and closed-loop tracking on top of the data we already have, and convert live CPG interest into contracted revenue.
Ship the leg that turns a list into an order — the product step that unlocks the take-rate business.